Built, bought and embedded AI
From AI visibility
to verifiable control.
See how a SAFE-AI-aligned assessment connects the AI inventory, control evidence and priority gaps to a secure AI control plane.
Illustrative evidence window: September 2026
A foundation to build on.
AI coverage to prove.
The sample organization has established security processes. The next step is to demonstrate that those processes cover its AI systems, data, identities and actions.
One control awaits assessment
4 high · 2 medium
Owners, dependencies and exit criteria
Keep the foundation.
Close the AI gaps.
Assessment and risk-management practices are evidenced in the sample. Approval, agent permissions, data boundaries and supplier controls need more complete AI coverage. Monitoring remains unverified.
Explore the target control plane- Confirm the AI boundary. Resolve two pending uses and agree the discovery blind spots.
- Prioritize exposure. Constrain agent actions and protect sensitive data paths.
- Fund evidence of operation. Assign control owners and validate effectiveness before closing findings.
Documented does not always mean demonstrated.
Each selected control is evaluated across requirements, operating evidence and explicit AI coverage.
Illustrative judgments for this sample scope. “No evidence” means effectiveness is unknown; “not met” requires a confirmed gap. No aggregate compliance score or certification is implied.
Profile: not rated yet.
The Profile summarizes five AI Clarity dimensions. This fictional sample shows selected control findings, but does not contain evidence-backed ratings for all 25 criteria. No dimension scores are assigned.
Use the inventory and control findings as inputs, complete the Clarity rubric, and retain unknowns explicitly. The roadmap can still address the evidenced gaps while that work is completed.
Explore the five dimensions ↗ · Read the assessment method ↗
Knowledge agent → permissions gap → enforceable action boundary
Open the inventory record, inspect the control conclusion, and see the action and proof needed for closure.
Know the AI.
Know its boundaries.
A practical register connects each use case to its owner, data, model, identities, permissions and control findings.
Showing 6 of 6 sample systems
| AI system | Type | Accountable owner | Approval | Risk tier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
AI-01Workplace assistantView inventory detail
| Bought | Workplace technology | Approved | Moderate |
AI-02Research copilotView inventory detail
| Bought | Research operations | Under review | High |
AI-03Knowledge agentView inventory detail
| Built | AI platform | Under review | High |
AI-04Support assistantView inventory detail
| Embedded | Customer operations | Approved | High |
AI-05Developer assistantView inventory detail
| Bought | Engineering | Approved | Moderate |
AI-06Document classifierView inventory detail
| Built | Data operations | Approved | Moderate |
No systems match these filters.
Risk tiers are illustrative business-impact judgments. Approval does not mean every control is effective. Supplemental inventory discipline supports the assessment; it is not presented as a separate MITRE certification requirement.
From control intent
to evidence of operation.
Twelve selected NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 references from MITRE SAFE-AI Appendix D illustrate the assessment method. This is an excerpt, not a full assessment.
Is it defined?
Approved policies, standards, roles and criteria establish the expected control.
Does it work?
Records, configurations, reviews and tests demonstrate operation for an agreed period and sample.
Does it cover this AI?
Confirm applicability across the environment, AI platform, models and data.
| Control / conclusion | Result | Requirement | Operation | AI coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AC-1 | Partial | Evidenced | Limited | Partial |
AC-3Access EnforcementRole rules exist; allowed/denied retrieval tests for the knowledge agent have not been supplied. Sample evidence: E-05 permission export; retrieval test request open Linked findings: G-02 | Partial | Evidenced | Not evidenced | Partial |
AC-4Information Flow EnforcementData classifications are defined; AI destinations and blocked-transfer evidence are incomplete. Sample evidence: E-07 data-use policy; E-04 connector configuration Linked findings: G-03 | Partial | Evidenced | Limited | Partial |
AC-6Least PrivilegeThe pilot agent connector has broader write permissions than its approved task requires. Sample evidence: E-05 permission export and pilot scope Linked findings: G-02 | Partial | Evidenced | Limited | Partial |
| AC-20 | Partial | Evidenced | Limited | Partial |
AU-2Event LoggingApplication logs are defined; actor, model, connector and policy-decision fields are inconsistent. Sample evidence: E-10 sample log schema and retention standard Linked findings: G-05 | Partial | Evidenced | Limited | Partial |
CA-2Control AssessmentsThe scoped assessment program retains reviewed procedures, sample operating records and tracked actions for AI. Sample evidence: E-09 assessment plan and signed review sample Linked findings: No open finding for this scoped conclusion. | Met | Evidenced | Evidenced | Evidenced |
CM-3Configuration Change ControlModel, prompt and connector change controls are scheduled for a follow-up review; no effectiveness conclusion is made. Sample evidence: E-08 registry only; release evidence not reviewed Linked findings: G-06 | Not assessed | Not reviewed | Not reviewed | Not reviewed |
RA-3Risk AssessmentScoped use-case assessments retain threat scenarios, business impact, owners and treatment decisions. Open treatments remain tracked. Sample evidence: E-09 use-case risk records and approval decisions Linked findings: No open finding for this scoped conclusion. | Met | Evidenced | Evidenced | Evidenced |
SA-9External System ServicesSupplier obligations exist; data reuse, model changes and AI incident responsibilities need explicit confirmation. Sample evidence: E-06 supplier assurance pack Linked findings: G-04 | Partial | Evidenced | Limited | Partial |
SI-4System MonitoringNo AI monitoring evidence was supplied within the review window. Monitoring effectiveness is unknown. Sample evidence: E-11 monitoring request outstanding Linked findings: G-05 | No evidence | Not evidenced | Not evidenced | Not evidenced |
SR-2Supply Chain Risk Management PlanThe sample owner confirms that no maintained plan covers AI models, connectors and upstream dependencies. Sample evidence: E-12 owner interview; plan absence confirmed Linked findings: G-04 | Not met | Absent | Not evidenced | Absent |
How to read the results and methodology
Met: the agreed criteria are evidenced for the scoped sample. Partial: some criteria or AI coverage remain incomplete. Not met: a control deficiency is confirmed. No evidence: effectiveness cannot be concluded. Not assessed: review has not been performed.
These labels and three evidence dimensions are Ascendra’s illustrative assessment presentation, not a MITRE rating scale. System applicability, criteria, sample period and residual risk must be agreed for a real engagement. All evidence IDs, organizations and judgments on this page are fictional.
Framework reference: MITRE SAFE-AI, April 2025 — Appendices D and E ↗. The target control plane and roadmap are Ascendra recommendations, not a MITRE-prescribed product architecture.
Every gap needs
a control, an owner and proof.
Priorities reflect the fictional scenario’s data exposure, action permissions and uncertainty. Evidence gaps remain distinct from confirmed control failures.
Bring observed AI into the approval process
Two observed systems do not have a completed approval decision. The register does not yet reconcile every discovery source.
Required controls & closure evidence
- Business risk
- Unreviewed use can bypass permitted data, supplier and accountability decisions.
- Target state
- One owned registry connects discovery, risk classification, approval, conditions and retirement.
- Required action
- Reconcile tenant, browser, procurement and platform records. Approve, restrict or retire both uses; document blind spots.
- Accountable owner
- AI governance
- Evidence to close
- Reconciled six-system register; two signed decisions; source coverage and exception log.
- Use existing capabilities first
- Extend existing inventory and intake workflow; add discovery only where source coverage is missing.
Constrain what agents can see and do
The agent has excess connector privileges, and retrieval authorization tests have not been evidenced.
Required controls & closure evidence
- Business risk
- A manipulated or mistaken agent could expose restricted content or perform an unauthorized action.
- Target state
- Every human and workload identity has task-specific permissions; retrieval and tool actions enforce authorization.
- Required action
- Reduce connector scopes, retain human approval for writes, review service identities and test denied as well as allowed paths.
- Accountable owner
- IAM + AI platform
- Evidence to close
- Approved permission matrix; reduced scopes; access-review record; retrieval and action test results.
- Use existing capabilities first
- Reuse identity, secrets and application authorization controls; add action-level enforcement at uncovered tool boundaries.
Enforce data boundaries across AI channels
Classification rules exist, but approved AI destinations and prohibited-flow checks are incomplete.
Required controls & closure evidence
- Business risk
- Sensitive data may leave approved boundaries through prompts, uploads, retrieval or connected tools.
- Target state
- Classification and permitted-use rules follow data from source to model, connector, output and retention boundary.
- Required action
- Map flows and permitted destinations. Apply classification-aware controls and verify representative block/allow scenarios.
- Accountable owner
- Data security + privacy
- Evidence to close
- Approved data-flow map; provider retention decisions; blocked/allowed transfer tests; reviewed exceptions.
- Use existing capabilities first
- Extend existing data protection, browser, network and application controls; evaluate an AI gateway only for uncovered paths.
Make supplier and model dependencies accountable
AI-specific service obligations are incomplete and an AI supply-chain plan is confirmed absent.
Required controls & closure evidence
- Business risk
- Unclear data use, component changes and incident duties can leave risk outside the operating model.
- Target state
- Approved dependencies have accountable owners, explicit service conditions and review triggers.
- Required action
- Record providers, models and connectors. Resolve training/retention terms, locations, change notices and incident duties.
- Accountable owner
- Third-party risk + procurement
- Evidence to close
- Approved dependency plan; responsibility matrix; supplier decisions; contract or exception records.
- Use existing capabilities first
- Extend procurement and third-party risk processes before introducing a separate AI supplier tool.
Prove that AI activity can be detected and contained
Logging fields vary and no AI monitoring evidence was received. This does not establish that monitoring is absent.
Required controls & closure evidence
- Business risk
- Suspicious usage or data movement may not be attributable, investigated or contained promptly.
- Target state
- Owned telemetry covers in-scope channels and supports alerts, investigation, revocation and response.
- Required action
- Confirm log sources and retention; link identities, systems and policy decisions; exercise alerts and credential or connector revocation.
- Accountable owner
- Security operations
- Evidence to close
- Coverage register; traceable event sample; alert investigation; containment exercise with owner and timing.
- Use existing capabilities first
- Use existing logging and incident tooling; add collection or detection where AI-specific context is missing.
Validate security when the AI system changes
Model, prompt and connector change controls were not assessed. The residual uncertainty needs an owner and review date.
Required controls & closure evidence
- Business risk
- A material change may invalidate earlier approval, permission assumptions or test results.
- Target state
- Changes trigger proportionate review, regression checks, release approval and a tested rollback path.
- Required action
- Assess existing release controls, define AI change triggers and validate a representative model or connector release.
- Accountable owner
- Engineering + security assurance
- Evidence to close
- Reviewed change procedure; one approved release with test evidence; rollback record; residual-risk decision.
- Use existing capabilities first
- Extend existing delivery and assurance workflows; evaluate additional testing only after coverage is understood.
A secure AI control plane.
Defined by what it can enforce.
A coordinated set of governance, identity, data, runtime and assurance controls across the AI estate. Each capability has an owner and verifiable evidence.
Discover & decide
Register every in-scope AI use and its owner.
Registry coverage and two approvals unresolved.
Owned inventory, approval gates, risk tier, exceptions and retirement.
Authorize identities & actions
Limit who and what can act.
Agent privileges and authorization evidence incomplete.
Human and workload identities, least privilege, retrieval checks and approval for sensitive actions.
Protect data & execution
Apply policy where AI is used.
Data destinations and enforcement coverage incomplete.
Permitted models and destinations, data controls, tool boundaries and tested block/allow decisions.
Govern dependencies
Control what enters the AI estate.
Provider terms and dependency plans incomplete.
Approved providers, model and connector records, responsibility boundaries and change obligations.
Observe & respond
Trace activity and contain incidents.
Logging partial; monitoring not evidenced.
Correlated events, defined detections, response ownership and tested revocation or shutdown.
Validate & improve
Keep approval tied to evidence.
AI change controls not yet assessed.
Release checks, recurring control review, closure validation and residual-risk acceptance.
The ideal state is a measurable operating target. Closure requires agreed tests and evidence, with residual risk accepted by the accountable owner; no architecture eliminates all AI risk.
A route from findings
to a defensible target state.
Sequence the highest exposures first, then verify operating effectiveness. These time bands are a sample plan, subject to scope and dependencies.
Establish the boundary
Accountable lead: AI governance + IAM
- Reconcile the inventory and resolve both approval decisions.
- Reduce pilot-agent permissions; retain the write-action hold.
- Assign owners to all open control and evidence gaps.
- Dependency
- Sponsor agrees scope, risk owners and evidence access.
- Exit criteria
- 6/6 known records have owners and allowed-use conditions; 2/2 pending uses have decisions; excess agent scopes removed.
Close the control gaps
Accountable lead: Data security + third-party risk
- Validate retrieval and tool authorization.
- Implement the agreed data-flow and provider controls.
- Approve supplier obligations and the AI dependency plan.
- Dependency
- Inventory, permissions and priority data paths are agreed.
- Exit criteria
- All agreed high-risk allow/deny scenarios pass or have approved exceptions; each scoped supplier has an accountable decision.
Demonstrate operation
Accountable lead: Security operations + assurance
- Validate telemetry coverage and a containment exercise.
- Assess a material AI change and verify rollback.
- Reassess open findings and document residual-risk decisions.
- Dependency
- Enforcement is deployed and reviewable operating evidence is available.
- Exit criteria
- Each in-scope system has verified monitoring coverage or an owned exception; closure evidence is independently reviewed.
Implemented → evidenced → independently reviewed → accepted
Update the inventory and control record, retain the validation result, assign residual risk, and set the next review trigger. A completed task alone does not close a finding.
What would this reveal
about your AI estate?
Start with the systems you use, the evidence you have and the decisions you need to make.
Public sample only. All system records, evidence references and results are fictional. No customer data or live integrations.