Visibility
- V1 · AI inventory
- V2 · Discovery coverage
- V3 · Attribution
- V4 · Data and action visibility
- V5 · Change reconciliation
A risk-based framework for understanding AI, assessing applicable controls and planning how to enforce them. For AI you build, AI you consume and the systems connecting both.
Understand the capabilities behind responsible AI adoption. Explore each dimension to see the question it answers and the evidence behind it.
Establish the AI footprint: applications, embedded AI, models, agents and connections. Reconcile what is approved with what is observed, and make remaining blind spots explicit.
EVIDENCE TO EXAMINEInventory records, named owners, discovery coverage, data flows and agent or tool activity.
Explore the assessment offerPurchased tools and embedded features. Assess intended use, information shared, integrations, reliance on outputs and the split between supplier and customer responsibilities.
Applications, retrieval systems and agents. Extend the assessment to data pipelines, prompts, models, tools, deployment and ongoing operation.
A purchased model connected to internal data and tools can involve both. Assess what the system does and what your organization controls.
A person reviews the output before use. No sensitive information or connected action is involved.
Routine approval under delegated authority, with a clear route to report problems.
The three pillars establish the baseline, evidence and roadmap. This six-step lifecycle connects them to implementation and ongoing assurance.
Identify AI uses, owners, data and connections. Record visibility gaps.
Evaluate consequences and authority. Assign a justified use-case risk tier.
Define required safeguards, shared responsibilities and justified exclusions.
Apply agreed controls across identities, gateways, pipelines and operations.
Test effectiveness. Remediate, restrict, accept residual risk or stop.
Track activity, performance and changes. Reassess and verify remediation.
Know which agents, models and connectors are approved, what they do and who owns them.
How we verify it: Reconcile observed activity to approved records and resolve unowned assets.
Identify each agent and constrain its authority, including read versus write access and delegation on behalf of a user.
How we verify it: Attempt prohibited actions and verify that authorization and revocation work.
Apply sensitive-data restrictions, approved connections, DLP and checks at tool execution boundaries.
How we verify it: Test attempted data disclosure and unauthorized tool invocation.
Define quality and security acceptance criteria. Control changes to models, prompts, sources and tools.
How we verify it: Review release evidence and revalidate representative scenarios after material change.
Make required approvals enforceable. Name escalation owners and people authorized to intervene.
How we verify it: Test approval bypass, stale approvals and actions changed after approval.
Connect relevant inputs, versions, sources, tool calls, outputs and approvals so incidents and questioned decisions can be investigated.
How we verify it: Exercise alerts, suspension, rollback and recovery. Protect traces with appropriate redaction, access and retention.
Five proposed criteria in each dimension. Define applicability, evidence and test expectations before scoring. A detailed reference crosswalk and criterion-specific anchors require pilot development.
Shared evidence can support distinct outcomes. Avoid duplicate credit for the same fact. Governance defines oversight; operational assurance tests whether intervention works.
Agent and MCP assessments feed the same dimensions when those architectures are present.
Award the highest cumulative level supported by all required anchors. A criterion with several required outcomes takes the lowest demonstrated level. The dimension is the equal-weight mean of applicable criteria, shown to one decimal.
Equal weighting is a proposed pilot convention. Do not calculate an overall average across dimensions or interpret maturity as the probability of loss.
Insufficient evidence means Unrated. Publish a dimension score only when every applicable criterion in it is rateable. Document and independently review N/A exclusions.
Report scope, assessment period, method version, evidence completeness, operational coverage and significant findings alongside any rating.
Assess inherent risk before controls, then residual risk after considering demonstrated effectiveness. Severe consequences trigger minimum requirements; they must not disappear in an average.
Critical exposures remain visible as Priority action. Serious unknowns require further evidence. Risk acceptance does not raise a capability rating.
Keep artifacts, sources, dates, populations, samples, test results and assessor rationale. Distinguish provider controls from customer duties. Review material judgments and retain disagreements.
A policy supports design. Operating records support implementation. Representative tests support effectiveness.
Explore the five dimensions, scoring rules and the path to independent validation.
Read the white paperPDF · v0.2 · Consultation draft. This site’s v0.3 proposal adds explicit three-pillar delivery, use-case risk tiering and control implementation. Pilot validation remains ahead.
MITRE SAFE-AI supplies the security assessment foundation through AI-specific consideration of controls. NIST AI RMF informs broader governance and risk outcomes. Ascendra’s five dimensions, scoring, risk-tier examples and presentation are proposed design choices, not official mappings or endorsements.
Version 0.3 · 13 October 2026 · Consultation proposal. The next stage is to complete assessment anchors and crosswalks, run calibration pilots and test agreement between independent assessors. No certification, industry percentile or validated benchmark is claimed.
Contribute feedbackStart with your use cases, priorities and existing controls. We’ll help define a practical assessment scope.
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